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6M CITY OF WHITTiER v. nIXON [24 C.M 
Cai.App.2d 299 [66 P.2d 746]), but not to unknown claims 
againSt others. 
Plaintiff iI). the present action may therefore recover: (a) 
damages for that part of the injury that can be attributed 
to malpractice of the defendants, which, because of their rep-
resentations, innocent or otherwise, were not included in 
the judgment against Wubben; (b) that part of the dam-
ages included in the jUdgment against Wubben that can be 
attributed to malpractice of defendants, less such part, if any, 
of the $5,753.22 already received from Wubben as exceeds 
~e ,amount of damages for which Wubben is alone responsible. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
'Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Septem-
per 1,1944. 
fL. A. No. 19005. In Bank. Aug. 11, 1944;] 
'OITY OF WHITTIER et al., Petitioners, v. GUY N. DIXON, 
. as City Clerk, etc., Respondent. 
Ell 'Mandamus-Duties Enforceable.-Mandamus wUl lie to COUl-
pel theperfonnance of a ministerial duty, such as the signing 
, of a bond or, wanant or the issuance of a warrant. 
[2]Statutes-Titl~Su1li.ciency of . ....;.The title of an act meets 
the requi,rements of Const., art. IV, § 24, if it contains a rea-
, ;, sonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the, legis-
lation is addressed. 
'[3J Automobiles-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943.-The 
title of the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, 
p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3) contains 
, a reasonably intelligible reference to the subject to which the 
legislation is addressed. The levy and collection of assess-
'ments mentioned in the title include reassessments, and the 
reference in the title to the acquisition and construction of 
parking places and other improvements for parking includes 
,[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 804; 34 Am.Jur. 859. 
[2J 'See 23 Cal.Jur. 650 j 50 Am.Jur. 137. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 6; [2] Statuttls, § 48; 
o-'n A,)ltomnbiles" § 8. 
,q3~-' 
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the acquisition and improvement of lands, property and 
rights of way necessary or convenient for ingress to or 
egress from any parking place. 
[4] Id.-Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943.-The Vehicle 
Parking District Act of 1943 does not violate Const., art. 
XI, § 13, prohibiting the delegation of any municipal func-
tion to a special commission, where the parking place com-
missioners therein authorized to be appointed are city officers 
appointed by the legislative body of the city when it elects 
to acquire parking places under the act, and are removable 
at the pleasure of that body. 
[5] Id.~Parking Places.-Legislation authorizing the acquisition 
of parking places to serve the public is valid so long as it 
serves some public purpose. Public parking places relieve 
congestion and reduce traffic hazards and therefore serve a 
public purpose. 
[6] Id.-Parking Places-Aflsessments.-Parking places that tend 
to, stabilize a business section benefit the property in the 
vicinity so as to justify the levy of a special assessment in 
connection with the acquisition of such places; 
[7] ld.-Parking Places-Eminent Domain.-A city can condemn 
property for parking places under the Vehicle Parking Dis-
trict Act of 1943, although snch authority is not granted by 
the eminent domain provisions of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, as the Vehicle Parking District Act is a general law 
and expressly authorizes the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain to acquire parking lots. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel a city clerk to 
countersign a warrant for payment of costs of pUblication of 
an ordinance of intention. Writ granted. 
Henry L. Knoop, City Attorney, 0 'Melveny & Myers and 
James.L. Beebe for Petitioners. 
Clyde C. Woodworth for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By this proceeding in mandamus petition-
ers seek to compel respondent city clerk to countersign a war-
rant for the payment of the costs of publication of an ordi-
nance of intention, in a proceeding for the formation of Ve-
hicle Parking District No. 1 of the City of Whlttier, under 
the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943. (Stats. 1943, ch. 
971, p. 2859; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1943, Act 5131.3.) Re-
spondent has refused to countersign the warrant contending 
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that the statute pursuant to which the publication was made, 
is invalid. The regularity of the proceedings is admitted. 
[1] It is established that mandamus will lie to compel the 
performance of a ministerial duty such as the signing of a 
bond or warrant or the, issuance of a warrant. (Golden Gate 
Bridge etc. Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 316 [5 P.2d 585] ; Mer-
cury Herald 00. v. Moore, 22 Ca1.2d 269 [138 P.2d 673, 147 
A.L.R. 1111].) The only issue in this case, therefore, is the 
validity of the Vehicle Parking District Act of 1943. 
Respondent contends that the title of the act does not meet 
the requirements of section 24 of article IV of the California 
Constitution, on the ground that the provisions of the act 
relating to reassessments, the acquisition of property for open-
ing, widening, straightening, or extending of streets or alleys 
necessary or convenient for ingress to or egress from any 
parking place, and the improvement of such streets and alleys, 
are not within the title of the act. The title of the act reads 
as follows: "An act to provide for the formation of districts 
within municipalities for the acquisition, construction, mainte-
nance and operation of parking places, garages and other 
improvements for the parking of motor vehicles; the levy and 
collection of assessments upon property in said districts; the 
issuance, sale and payment of bonds secured by such assess-
ments; the collection of rentals, fees, and charges for the use 
- of such parking places, garages or other improvements; the 
administration thereof; the levy of taxes; and the powen; and 
duties of cities relating thereto." [2] The title of an act 
meets the constitutional requirements if it contains a reason-
ably intelligible reference to the subject to which the legisla-
tion is addressed. (Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507 [28~ P. 160] ; 
Evans v. Superior Oourt, 215 Cal. 58 [8 P.2d 467]; Southern 
Service 00. v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 1 [97 P.2d 
963] ; Powers Farms v. Oonsolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 123 
[119 P.2d 717].) [3] The title in question fulfills this con-
dition. The levy and collection of assessments mentioned in 
the title includes reassessments, for a reassessment is merely 
an assessment levied in lieu of some earlier assessment. The 
reference in the title to the acquisition and construction of 
parking places and other improvements for the parking of 
motor vehicles includes the acquisition and improvement of 
lands, property, and rights of way necessary or convenient 
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for ingress to or egress from any parking place as a necessary 
incident to the construction of the parking place itself. 
(Powers Farms v. Oonsolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Ca1.2d 123 [119 
P.2d 717].) 
[4] Respondent contends that by authorizing the appoint-
ment of a board of parking place commissioners, the act vio-
lates section 13 of article XI of the California Constitution 
prohibiting the delegation of any municipal function to a 
special cummission. The parking place commissioners, how-
ever, are city officers appointed by the legislative body of the 
city when it elects to acquire parking places under the act, 
and are removable at the pleasure of that body. It is the local 
governing body and not the Legislature that confers upon 
the ,"ommission the right to exercise its function. Such a 
commission does not come within the prohibition of section 13 
of article XI of the Constitution. (Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 
[14 P. 71] ; In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 87 [88 P. 270, 11 Ann. 
Cas. 911, 11 L.R.A.N.S. 1092J ; Housing Authority v. Dock-
weiler, 14 Cal.2d 437, 463 [94 P.2d 794].) 
[5] Respondent contends that public parking places are 
not public improvements. The Legislature, however, has ex-
pressly authorized the acquisition of parking places to serve 
the public, and the legislation is valid so long as it serves some 
public purpose. (In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368 [77 P. 180]; 
Oounty of Los Angeles v. Dodge, 51 Cal.App. 492 [197 P. 
403] ; Egan v. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576 [133 P. 294, Ann. 
Cas. 1915A 754] ; Larsen v. San Francisco, 182 Cal. 1 [186 
P. 757] ; Irish v. Hahn, 208 Cal. 339 [281 P. 385, 66 A.L.R. 
1382].) Just as public streets can be used :Eor the parking of 
motor vehicles, property can be acquired :Eor the same use. 
Moreover, public parking places relieve congestion and reduce 
traffic hazards and therefore serve a public purpose. They 
may be compared to municipal airports, which have been 
recognized as public improvements. (Krenwinkle v. Oity of 
Los Angeles, 4 Ca1.2d 611 [51 P.2d 1098] ; see 63 A.L.R. 777; 
69 A.L.R. 325; 135 A.L.R. 755.) 
[6] The levy of a special assessment is justified if the 
improvement is a public one and the property to be assessed 
will receive a special benefit. (Mills v. Oity of Elsinore, 93 
Cal.App. 753 [270 P. 224] ; Federal Oonstruction 00. v. En-
sign, 59 Cal.App. 200 [210 P. 536] ; Lloyd v. Redondo Beach, 
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124 Cal.App. 541 [12 P.2d 1087].) Merchants frequently 
acquire and operate private parking places to attract cus-
tomers and vacate buildings when no parking space for cus-
tomers is available. Parking places that tend to stabilize a 
business section, by making it readily accessible to trade, bene-
fit the property in the vicinity. (See Lloyd v. Oity of Re-
dondo Beach, supra.) 
[7] Respondent contends finally that the city cannot con-
demn property for parking places, on the ground that such 
authority is not granted by the eminent domain provisions of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. The Vehicle Parking District 
Act, however, is a general law and expressly provides for the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire parking 
lots. (See Frank v. Maguire, 201 Cal. 414, 422 [257 P. 515].) 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, 
J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
the conclusion of my associates that the Vehicle Parking Dis-
trict Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 2859) is valid upon its face, 
but I again point out that n question of public interest is de-
cided in a "friendly suit" to which only the city, its clerk, awl 
fhe publisher of the municipality's leg::.! advertising nrc par-
ties. In my opinion, such an action is collusive and for the 
reasons I have previously stated, should not be entertained 
by this court. (Oity and Oounty of San Francisco v. Boyd, 
22 Ca1.2d 685, 707 [140 P.2d 666] ; and Oity and Oounty of 
San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Ca1.2d 441, 448 [106 P.2d 639].) 
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[L. A. No. 18762. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1944.] 
SCRIPPS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. (a Nonprofit Cor-
poration), Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOY-
MENT COMMISSION, Appellant. 
(Three Cases.) 
[1] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Action to Re-
cover Protested Payment.-·The only express provision in the 
Unemployment Insurance Act for court review is § 45.10, 
added to the statute in 1939 (Stats. 1939, p. 2051; Deering'S 
Gen. Laws. 1939 Supp., Act 878Od), which permits an em-
ployer to sue to recover contributions paid under protest. 
[2] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Pay-
ment-Conditions Precedent.-An employer who claims an 
exemption from assessment under the Unemployment Insurance 
.Act is not required to ask a reassessment as provided in § 45.5, 
hefore he may sue to recover contributions paid by him under 
protest, as the right to bring such an action is directly given 
in § 45.10 without qualification. The rule that an administra-
tive remedy provided by statute must be exhausted before the 
I\ourts will act does not apply in such a situation. 
[3] rd.-Employers Exempt from Contributions-Charitable In-
stitutions.-The wide and varied nature of the exemptions 
provided in the Unemployment Insurance Act, § 7(g), indi-
cates an intention to give to the words "operated exclusively 
for ... charitable ... purposes" a broad rather than a strict 
meaning, and to apply the sort of standards to charitable 
institutions which are applied to the others named in said 
section. 
[4) Statutes-Construction-Statutes Adopted from Other Juris-
dictions.-Where the language used in Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, § 7 (g), is practically identical with that used in 
similar sections of the federal legislation and in that of many 
states, the interpretation placed on that language by federal 
and other courts is persuasive. 
[5) Unemployment Relief - Remedies of Employer - Action to 
Recover Protested Payment--Evidence.-In consolidated ac-
tions by a nonprofit hospital corporation to recover contribu-
[1] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "Unemploy-
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
[4] See 23 Cal.Jur. 794; 50 Am.Jur. 47l. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5, 6] Unemployment Relief; [4J 
Statutes, § 199. 
.~ 
